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A substantial increase in the range, significance and impact of corporate social and 
environmental initiatives in recent years suggests the growing materiality of 
sustainability. Corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR) appears to 
becoming established in many corporations as a critical element of strategic direction, 
and one of the main drivers of business development, as well as an essential component 
of risk management. CSR seems to be rapidly moving from the margins to the 
mainstream of corporate activity, with greater recognition of a direct and inescapable 
relationship between corporate governance, corporate responsibility, and sustainable 
development. 
 
Questions are often addressed to the sincerity of corporate social and environmental 
initiatives; the legality of company directors engaging in these concerns; equally, the 
legality of the trustees of investment institutions attending to these interests; and the 
verifiability of CSR activities and outcomes.  The aim of this chapter is to clarify the 
continuing and emerging legal and commercial basis for corporations to pursue corporate 
social and environmental responsibility; the ongoing legal and material support for 
institutional trustees to prioritize socially and environmentally responsible investments; 
to examine developments in verification on corporate reporting of CSR performance.  
 
The chapter outlines the tensions between the promise of corporate initiatives in CSR and 
the significance of mandatory regulation. There may well be the case that further 
legislative and regulatory intervention will be required to ensure all corporations fully 
respond to the growing public demand that they recognize their wider social and 
environmental responsibilities. However it is useful to examine how far CSR objectives 










Corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR) is rapidly moving from the 
margins to the mainstream of corporate activity, with greater recognition of a direct and 
inescapable relationship between corporate governance, corporate responsibility, business 
performance and sustainable business development. 
Corporate social responsibility is receiving considerably increased attention world-wide 
and is associated with significant economic, environmental and social benefits. It is 
important to learns from this international experience as well as from local initiatives.  
The burgeoning importance of this newly revived movement for corporate responsibility 
and sustainability  is demonstrated by the current frequency and scale of activity at every 
level (Calder and Culverwell 2005:43).  
 
Among international organizations the United Nations is coordinating a public-private 
partnership between UNEP and 170 banks, insurers and asset managers world-wide 
including Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and 
UBS to explore the financial materiality of environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues to securities valuation (UNEP 2004a). Early in 2005 the UN convened a group of 
20 of the world’s largest institutional investors from 12 countries to negotiate a set of 
Principles of Responsible Investment,  published in early 2006 as a guide to the 
investment community on how to incorporate environmental, social and governance 
issues into their investment decision-making and ownership processes. This document 
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was launched at the New York Stock Exchange in April 2006 sets out six aspirational 
principles of responsible investment.  In the document’s introduction, Kofi Annan neatly 
sums up the main issue hindering companies’ efforts at CSR: 
 
“One of the main problems has long been the troubling disconnect between 
corporate responsibility as a broadly stated management imperative, and the 
actual behaviour of financial markets, which are too often guided primarily by 
short-term considerations at the expense of longer-term objectives.’ 
 
The six principles are designed to help solve this problem.  Principle one states, “We will 
incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes”.  The 
other principles go on to back this up through commitments to request ESG disclosure, 
promote the principles and report on their implementation.   
 
There are three main categories of signatory to the UN principles: asset owners, 
investment managers and professional service partners.  At the time of writing, there 
were a total of 217 signatories representing 8 trillion US dollars. Australian 
representation is fairly impressive with 12 Australian super funds, 9 Australian 
investment managers and 4 Australian professional service partners already signed up to 
the principles.  That means Australia makes up just over 11% of signatories worldwide, 
although we do not know what proportion of overall funds this represents. 
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This recent work of the UNEP Finance Initiative builds on the work of the UN Global 
Compact which achieved more than 1,500 corporate signatories, working with the 
world’s leading stock exchanges and the World Federation of Exchanges to advance the 
principles of corporate responsibility in capital markets and with public corporations (UN 
2000). The Global Compact outlined a set of basic principles of human rights, labour and 
the environment which manifested a commitment to civilization, decency and 
responsibility on the part of investors and corporations. 
 
In 2005 institutional investors representing 21 trillion dollars in assets came together for 
the third Carbon Disclosure Project meeting, collectively requesting the world’s largest 
corporations to disclose information on greenhouse gas emissions and their approach to 
the management of carbon risks (UNEP FI 2005a). Finally, 36 of the world’s largest 
banks, representing more than 80% of the global project finance market, have adopted the 
Equator Principles, a set of voluntary principles outlining environmental, social and 
human rights disciplines associated with project finance above $50 million (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005a). The principles originally were developed by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector investment arm of the World 
Bank.  
 
The OECD also is active in the promotion of corporate social responsibility in its 
guidelines for the operations of multinational corporations; and the European Union is 
actively encouraging corporate social responsibility as the business contribution to 
sustainable development (OECD 2000; European Commission 2003;2004). At the 
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national level a growing number of governments in Europe, and across the globe, have 
identified strongly with the call for corporate social and environmental responsibility, 
even with the evident difficulties in applying the Kyoto Protocol and creating an effective 
international climate policy regime. 
 
At the corporate level the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and 
World Economic Forum Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative has projected corporate 
responsibility in the minds of the international business elite (WBCSD 2002;2004 ; WEF 
2005). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development published Beyond 
Reporting: Creating business value and accountability (2005) which was co-authored by 
several large companies and thus has a fairly unique perspective on CSR.  The report 
delves into the detail of how CSR should be integrated across different business functions 
and not simply delegated to a specialist unit.  It suggests that value can only be created if 
the majority of employees understand how to frame business challenges in a way that 
links with an overall sustainability agenda.  Using company case studies, the report gives 
examples of how CSR can become value-driving rather than compliance-driven. 
  
Other business organizations active in promoting CSR include the Business Leaders 
Initiative on Human Rights, the Conference Board, Business in the Community, and 
Business for Social Responsibility. A large number of leading corporations have signed 
up for the Global Reporting Initiative and more than 2,000 international corporations now 
publish reports on their CSR performance (many accessible on www.csrwire.com) (GRI 
2002). Reinforcing the new found willingness on the part of corporate executives to 
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disclose their commitments to CSR are the new indices including the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good. Finally there are a proliferating number of 
consultancies, NGOs and campaign groups offering guidance and actively monitoring 
CSR activities along the entire length of the global value chain (World Bank 2003). 
 
Questions are often addressed concerning the sincerity of corporate social and 
environmental initiatives; the legality of company directors engaging in these concerns; 
equally, the legality of the trustees of investment institutions attending to these interests; 
and the verifiability of CSR activities and outcomes.  It is intended in this paper to briefly 
clarify the continuing and emerging legal and commercial basis internationally for 
corporations to pursue corporate social and environmental responsibility; the ongoing 
legal and material support for institutional trustees to prioritize socially and 
environmentally responsible investments; to examine developments in verification on 
corporate reporting of CSR performance; and to consider some illustrations of current 
best practice.  
 
THE INTEGRITY OF CSR 
Despite the recent burst of enthusiasm for corporate social and environmental 
responsibility in some quarters of the business community, the concept and practice still 
provoke a degree of understandable skepticism, (partly due to CSR’s record of lapsing 
into apologetics for unacceptable corporate behaviour) (Najam 2000; Christian Aid 2004; 
Corporate Responsibility Coalition 2005; OECD Watch 2005). David Vogal in a review 
conducted for the Brookings Institute, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of 
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CSR (2005), contends there are many reasons why companies may choose to behave 
more responsibly in the absence of legal requirements to do so, including strategic, 
defensive, altruistic or public spirited motivations. However despite pressure from 
consumers for responsibly made products, the influence of socially responsible investors, 
and the insistent call for companies to be accountable to a broader community of 
stakeholders there are important limits to the market for virtue: 
 
“CSR is best understood as a niche rather than a generic strategy: it makes sense for some 
firms in some areas under some circumstances. Many of the proponents of corporate 
social responsibility mistakenly assume that because some companies are behaving more 
responsibly in some areas, some firms can be expected to behave more responsibly in 
more areas. This assumption is misinformed. There is a place in the market economy for 
responsible firms. But there is also a large place for their less responsible competitors. 
..Precisely because CSR is voluntary and market-driven, companies will engage in CSR 
only to the extent that it makes business sense for them to do. Civil regulation has proven 
capable of forcing some companies to internalize some of the negative externalities 
associated with some of their economic activities. But CSR can reduce only some market 
failures” (2005:3-4). 
 
Vogal concludes that CSR has a multidimensional nature, and that companies, like 
individuals, do not always exhibit consistent moral or social behaviour, and may behave 
better in some countries than others depending on the social and environmental policies 
existing there. Since the origins of industrialism there have always been more or less 
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responsible firms, and though it may be heartening that executives in many highly visible 
firms may becoming more responsive (if only as a result of external stakeholder 
pressures) the reality is that the amounts wasted on the losses due to financial fraud, and 
the very substantial – and some would argue unwarranted -  increases in executive 
compensation in corporations in the recent period far exceed any resources companies 
have devoted to CSR.  
 
In a similar vein Deborah Doane who is Chair of the Corporate Responsibility Coalition 
in the UK, is skeptical regarding optimism about the power of market mechanisms to 
deliver social and environmental change, referring to the key myths informing the CSR 
movement as: 
 The market can deliver both short-term financial returns and long term social 
benefits. 
 The ethical consumer will drive change. 
 There will be a competitive ‘race to the top’ over ethics amongst businesses. 
 In the global economy countries will compete to have the best ethical practices. 
 
In support of her argument these are largely mythological trends she highlights the 
insistence of stock markets upon short term results, and the failure of companies to invest 
in long term benefits; the considerable gap between green consciousness expressed by 
consumers and their consumer behaviour; the inconsistency between companies 
alignment to CSR schemes and their successful efforts to bring about the sustained fall in 
corporate taxation in the United States and other jurisdictions in recent decades; and 
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finally the evidence emerging in developing countries of governments competing to 
reduce their insistence on the observance of social and environmental standards to attract 
international investment (Doane 2005). 
 
It may well be the case that further legislative and regulatory intervention will be required 
to ensure all corporations fully respond to the growing public demand that they recognize 
their wider social and environmental responsibilities. However it is useful to examine 
how far CSR objectives can be achieved within existing law and regulation. If there is 
substantial evidence of leading corporations demonstrating it is possible to voluntarily 
commit to social and environmental performance and to achieve commercial success -   
perhaps because of,  rather than in spite of, ethical commitments -  then it will be more 
straightforward to press for the legislative changes necessary to deal with corporations 
that refuse to acknowledge their wider responsibilities, as well as finding appropriate 
legislative support for companies that wish to develop further their CSR commitments. 
 
In the meantime the practical fact is that corporations and governments currently are 
struggling with an “almost bewildering array of international CSR initiatives” (Calder 
and Culverwell 2005:7; McKague and Cragg 2005).  Reviewing the efforts to develop 
CSR following the World Summit on Sustainable Development, a survey by the Royal 
Institute for International Affairs of stakeholders from governments, businesses and civil 
society groups identified a range of significant weaknesses in current approaches to 
promoting CSR which governments should seek to address: 
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 An over-proliferation of CSR initiatives at the international level and lack of 
clarity about how these initiatives relate to each other in a coherent way; 
 An excessive focus on getting businesses to make commitments to CSR and not 
enough focus on enabling them to implement them effectively; 
 An absence of credible monitoring and verification processes of CSR initiatives; 
 A lack of effective mechanisms of redress for communities affected by companies 
that flout national or international norms on sustainable development or human 
rights; 
 A lack of engagement with developing country governments and their sustainable 
development priorities (e.g. economic development and poverty reduction); 
 A failure to bridge the governance gap created by weak public sector governance 
of the private sector in many developing countries; 
 The limited impact on national and international sustainable development goals; 
 A lack of government involvement and/or investment in international CSR 
initiatives, which is contributing significantly to their underperformance 
(Calder and Culverwell 2005:7).   
 
DEFINING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
The rapidly developing interest in sustainability and corporate social and environmental 
responsibility has resulted in a plethora of definitions and interpretations of the two 
concepts from international agencies, consultancies and practitioners (Calder and 
Culverwell 2005; McKague and Cragg 2005). A first difficulty is that the most 
commonly employed acronym CSR refers to corporate social responsibility, though in 
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most interpretations is meant to include environmental responsibility also. The use of the 
simpler term corporate responsibility and acronym CR is not in widespread, though it 
would more readily embrace all corporate responsibilities. The UN’s recent adoption of 
the environmental, social and governance (ESG) acronym may become influential, since 
it explicitly links governance to social and environmental responsibility.   
 
More confusingly still, in some definitions CSR is subsumed under sustainability, while 
in others sustainability is included within CSR. One source of this confusion is that often 
different levels of analysis are being addressed. At the highest level the sustainability of 
the planet is at issue, and at lower levels the sustainability of economies and societies, 
industries and organizations. Corporate sustainability is a critical issue because of the 
economic scale and significance of these entities and their growing impact on the 
economy, society and environment. “Corporations have magnified capacities relative to 
individuals, in their financial resources, scale of operations, organizational capacity and 
capacity for social and individual harm” (Redmond 2005:1) Once the primary (in some 
cases sole) concern was to produce goods and services that might generate the profits to 
achieve the financial sustainability of the corporation (everything else was written off as 
externalities).  
 
Increasingly today the social and environmental impact of the corporation will be 
assessed in deciding whether it is viable or not, by governments, regulators, or other 
stakeholders, even if the corporations’ management are reluctant to make this assessment. 
The license to operate can no longer be readily assumed for any corporation, and in an 
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increasing number of contexts needs to be earned with verifiable evidence of the social 
and environmental responsibility of the corporation. 
 
Definitions of CSR and sustainability range from the basic to the most demanding, from a 
specific reference to a number of necessary activities to demonstrate responsibility, to a 
general call for a comprehensive, integrated and committed pursuit of social and 
environmental sustainability. The following representative range of definitions of CSR is 
broadly in ascending order from the least to the most demanding: 
 
 The integration of stakeholders’ social, environmental and other concerns into a 
company’s business operations (EIU 2002:2) 
  The commitment of businesses to contribute to sustainable economic 
development by working with their employees, their families, the local 
community and society at large to improve their lives in ways which are good for 
business and for development ( World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development 2002). 
 Corporate social responsibility is at heart a process of managing the costs and 
benefits of business activity to both internal (for example, workers, shareholders, 
investors) and external (institutions of public governance, community members, 
civil society groups, other enterprises) stakeholders. Setting the boundaries for 
how those costs and benefits are managed is partly a question of business policy 
and strategy and partly a question of public governance (World Bank 2002:1). 
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 A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis (EU2001). 
 A company’s commitment to operating in an economically, socially, and 
environmentally sustainable manner, while recognizing the interests of its 
stakeholders, including investors, customers, employees, business partners, local 
communities, the environment, and society at large (Certified General 
Accountants Association of Canada 2005:20). 
 CSR is essentially about how the company makes its profits, not only what it does 
with them afterwards. CSR is about how the company manages first, its core 
business operations – in the boardroom, in the workplace, in the marketplace, and 
along the supply chain; second, its community investment and philanthropic 
activities; and third, its engagement in public policy dialogue and institution 
building (Kennedy School of Government Corporate Responsibility Initiative: 
2004:33) 
 A business approach embodying open and transparent business practices, ethical 
behaviour, respect for stakeholders and a commitment to add economic, social 
and environmental value (SustainAbility 2005). 
 Sustainability performance refers to an organisation’s total performance, which 
might include its policies, decisions, and actions that create social, environmental 
and/or economic (including financial) outcomes (AccountAbility 2005:10). 
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Sustainability as a whole (planet, environment, species) is an altogether more ambitious 
project with more expansive definitions than CSR. Corporations have a vital role to play 
in this also, beginning with a modest recognition of their necessary subordination to the 
interests of maintaining a balanced ecosystem. Sustainability is defined as: 
 Meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their needs (Bruntland Commission 1987) 
 Sustainable development, sustainable growth, and sustainable use have been used 
interchangeably, as if their meanings were the same. They are not. Sustainable 
growth is a contradiction in terms: nothing physical can grow indefinitely. 
Sustainable use, is only applicable to renewable resources. Sustainable 
development is used in this strategy to mean: improving the quality of human life 
whilst living within the carrying capacity of the ecosystems (IUCN, UNEP, WWF 
1991). 
Putting the entire field into perspective, according to the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) 2002 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines: 
• environmental impact means an organization’s impact on living and non-living 
natural systems, including eco-systems, land, air and water. Examples include 
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions 
• social impact means an organization’s impact on the social system within which 
it operates. This includes labour practices, human rights and other social issues 
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• economic impact means an organization’s impact both direct and indirect on the 
economic resources of its stakeholders and on economic systems at the local, 
national and global levels. 
 
The world has reached the limits of the paradigm of the freedom of business to destroy in 
the name of wealth generation. For example with regard to the environment the Stern 
Review of the Economics of Climate Change (2006) has definitively stated: “The 
scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change is a serious global threat, and it 
demands an urgent global response…The evidence gathered by the Review leads to a 
simple conclusion: the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic 
costs of not acting. Climate change will affect the basic elements of life for people around 
the world –access to water, food production, health, and the environment. Hundreds of 
millions of people could suffer hunger, water shortages and coastal flooding as the world 
warms. Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimates that if we 
don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 
5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is 
taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more.” 
 
Corporate objectives described as wealth generating too frequently have resulted in the 
loss of well being to communities and the ecology. But increasingly in the future the 
licence to operate will not be given so readily to corporations and other entities. A 
licence to operate will depend on maintaining the highest standards of integrity and 
practice in corporate behaviour. Corporate governance essentially will involve a 
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sustained and responsible monitoring of not just the financial health of the company, but 
the social and environmental impact of the company. 
 
As Sustainable Asset Management Group (SAM) (2003:5) argue ‘Understanding the 
implications of these trends on business is central to sustainability investing as, despite 
lower interest rates, increased risk-premia have effectively erased the benefits of low 
costs of capital for business. The implications of environmental degradation and 
weakened eco-system have been starkly demonstrated by the spiralling costs of 
environmental catastrophes. Financial losses due to natural disasters have doubled each 
decade since the 1950s, and UNEP estimates that natural disasters caused by climate 
change could cost US$ 150 billionn a year by 2012. Socio-cultural disruptions have also 
had severe financial implications recently: insurers had to cover US$40 billion in losses 
after the September 11th disaster.”  This leads SAM (2003:2) to conceiving of a 
hypothesis of enlightened self-interest: “Should extreme climactic events such as 
flooding occur, the civility of society is disrupted and hence the healthy functioning of 
the economy undermined. This impacts the possibility of a vigorous population of 
enterprises thriving which, in turn, compromises the possibility of successful investment. 
Sustainability investing therefore selects companies that contribute to the vibrancy of the 
socio-economic system and a sustainable planet.’ 
 
In the past companies did not recognise or acknowledge the environmental and social 
effects of their operations, such as the impacts of releases to water have on river systems, 
or the effects of particular emissions upon human health. The United States 
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Environmental Protection Agency (1995:1) has developed a useful dichotomy – private 
versus social costs. The term environmental cost has at least two major dimensions: it can 
refer solely to costs that directly impact a company’s bottom line (termed private costs) 
or it can also encompass the costs to individuals, society, and the environment for which 
a company is not directly accountable (termed societal costs by the EPA but typically 
referred to as externalities). “Externalities generated by an organisation, although 
possibly ignored from an accounting perspective, are often recognised as costs by other 
entities.” (ICAA 2003:19) Consideration of the range of environmental costs an entity 
might be encouraged to consider widens the scope of accounting systems, though makes 
measurement more difficult. 
 
Together the trends indicated provide the context in which business must operate in 
future suggest the following imperatives which all corporations will face: 
• Maintaining a licence to operate via transparency and accountability 
• Serving society 
• Generating more value with less impact 
• Preserving the resource base 
• Doing business in a networked world. 
In summary the challenge is to find means of enduring value creation without social or 
environmental harm. As the Economist has recently noted, “Everybody’s Green Now,” 
even the big American energy companies that resisted environmental awareness most 




FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM? 
 
However challenging the prospects, there are growing indications of large corporations 
taking their social and environmental responsibilities more seriously, and of these issues 
becoming more critical in the business agenda. KPMG since 1993 have conducted an 
international survey of corporate responsibility every three years which has revealed the 
developing prevalence of this commitment. Surveying the largest 100 companies in a 
sample of advanced industrial OECD countries (with the addition of the Global 250 
companies from 1999), KPMG (2005) find a steadily rising trend in companies issuing 
separate corporate responsibility annual reports. From 13% of national 100 companies 
reporting on corporate responsibility matters in 1993, by 2005 this had risen to 33% (up 
to 41% if including information in annual reports). A more substantial increase in the 
Global 250 reporting occurred with 35% reporting in 1999 and 52% in 2005 (64% 
including information in annual reports). Publication of corporate responsibility reports 
as part of the annual financial reports of companies often implies the issue is regarded as 
of greater salience, and companies often progress from separate to integrated CSR and 
financial reports.  
 
More importantly, the substance of company reports is changing, from purely 
environmental reporting up until 1999, to sustainability reporting (social, environmental 
and economic), which has become the mainstream approach of the G250 companies, and 
is becoming so among the national 100 companies. The two leading countries in terms of 
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separate corporate responsibility reporting are Japan (80% of top 100 companies) and the 
UK (71 % of top 100 companies) in 2005. The industrial sectors with the highest 
environmental impact tend to lead in reporting (in one sense self-evidently important, in 
another sense deeply curious). At the Global 250 level over 80% of companies report in 
electronics and computers; utilities; automotive; and oil and gas sectors. The most 
remarkable increase in the Global 250 was in the finance sector, with a doubling of the 
rate of CSR reporting from 24% in 2002 to 57% in 2005. At the national level over 50% 
of top 100 companies are reporting in utilities; mining; chemicals and synthetics; oil and 
gas; and forestry and paper sectors. 
 
Finally the KPMG survey reveals a balanced range of business drivers for CSR reporting, 
beginning with economic considerations (74% of companies); ethical considerations 
(54%); innovation and learning (53%); employee motivation (47%); risk management 
(47%) and access to capital (39%). The survey suggests there were solid business reasons 
for acting and reporting on CSR: “The economic reasons were either directly linked to 
increased shareholder value or market share or indirectly linked through increased 
business opportunities, innovation, reputation, and reduced risk. Thirty-nine per cent of 
the companies reported improved shareholder value, and one in five (21 per cent) 





In a further recent international survey of 136 corporate executives and 65 executives of 
institutional investors on the importance of corporate responsibility (CR) the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) discovered a similar growth in interest:   
 
“A total of 88% of executives said that CR is a ‘central’ or ‘important’ consideration in 
decision-making. This compares with 54% of executives who said it was a ‘central’ or 
‘important’ consideration five years ago. The biggest percentage change between now 
and five years ago was among European executives. A total of 46% said CR was ‘central’ 
or ‘important’ five years ago compared with 84% at the present time. In Asia, the 
proportion rose from 49% to 82% and in North America from 66% to 88%. The survey of 
professional investors reveals a sharper trend. Eighty-one percent of those surveyed said 
CR was currently a ‘central’ or ‘important’ consideration in their investment decisions, 
compared with 34% who said it was ‘central’ or ‘important’ five years ago. In fact, 14% 
of them said CR was not a consideration at all five years ago. Now, not a single investor 
said it was not a consideration.” (EIU 2005:5) 
 
As with the gap noticed earlier between consumer consciousness and behaviour, it is 
likely there will be a mighty gap between the expressed concerns of executives for 
corporate responsibility and their actual behaviour in different circumstances in the 
exigencies of difficult situations, however simply expressing concerns is an advance over 
stony faced refusals to even acknowledge responsibilities that may have occurred in the 
past. “Corporate responsibility is really about ensuring that the company can grow on a 
sustainable basis, while ensuring fairness to all stakeholders,” says N R Murthy, the 
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chairman of an Indian IT firm, Infosys” (EIU 2005:2). Though some of the expressed 
concern may be part of the discourse of political correctness, there does appear to be a 
significant shifting of opinion among executives, as the EIU comments: 
 
“Until recently, board members often regarded corporate responsibility as a piece of 
rhetoric intended to placate environmentalists and human rights campaigners. But now, 
companies are beginning to regard corporate responsibility as a normal facet of business 
and are thinking about ways to develop internal structures and processes that will 
emphasize it more heavily. In the not-too-distant future, companies that are not focusing 
on corporate responsibility may come to be seen as outliers. As companies focus on non-
financial performance, an important yardstick of corporate responsibility, the 
measurement of intangibles, such as customer satisfaction and employee morale, are 
likely to become less vague and more credible”  (EIU 2005: 3). 
 
One of the surprising results of the EIU survey was that after more than a decade of the 
exhortation of the primacy in all circumstances of shareholder value, the executives 
surveyed still possessed a balanced appreciation of the relative importance of key 
stakeholders to the company, identifying customers, employees and shareholders in that 
order. The EIU compiled some of the contextual highlights for these changes in executive 
views in the emerging evidence that corporate social and environmental responsibility is 




 “The New York-based GovernanceMetrics International (GMI), which covers 
corporate governance and CR, now produces in-depth rating reports on 2000 
companies around the world and has a growing client base including TIAA-
CREF, State Street Bank and ABP, the largest pension fund in Europe. 
 
 More than 10,000 individuals and 3,000 listed companies have helped to develop 
the standards of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), an organisation based in 
Amsterdam, trying to create a single global measure for CR performance. Among 
its corporate clients implementing GRI standards are Bayer, Canon, Deutsche 
Bank, General Motors, Heineken and Shell. 
 
 A group of five major European institutional investors, including the second-
largest pension fund in the UK and the largest pension fund in the Netherlands, 
jointly stated in October 2004 that they would allocate 5% of their budgets for the 
purchase of non-financial research analysis of such topics as corporate 
governance, labour management and environmental practices. 
 
 One in every nine investment dollars under professional management in the US is 
now invested in socially responsible funds. This amounts to US$2 trillion 
(trillion) out of a total of US$19 trillion in investible funds, according to the 2003 
report on socially responsible investing (SRI) produced by the Social Investment 
Forum, the national trade body for the SRI industry.” (EIU 2005:4-5) 
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At the confluence of these multiple emerging initiatives and trends towards greater 
corporate social and environmental responsibility there is emerging a dynamic 
stakeholder model for driving enlightened shareholder value. At many leading 
corporations the pieces of what admittedly is a very large and demanding puzzle are 
beginning to come together. The wider commitments to building engaged and inclusive 
relationships with employees, economic partners, the community and the environment 
becomes a means of achieving enlightened shareholder value through access to a lower 
cost of capital, enhanced reputation, minimized risks and new business opportunities. 
 
 
CORPORATIONS ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE?  
THE DUTY TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY 
 
The impact of the adoption of corporate commitments to wider forms of social and 
environmental engagement and reporting will be determined essentially by initiatives of 
leading companies and, in turn, this will be influenced by the insistent pressures 
companies encounter from the market, investors and stakeholders, and the perceived 
commercial benefit of assuming a broader accountability. However, the role of the law 
and of accounting standards in establishing a framework of accountability and 
management discipline is a significant factor. Historical analysis of the perception of 
company directors’ duties, including legal interpretations, reveals much greater sympathy 
for corporations adopting a wider view of their responsibilities than the recently imposed 
tenets of shareholder value would suggest. 
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This balance of pursuing market opportunities while maintaining accountability has 
proved a defining challenge for business enterprise since the arrival of the joint-stock 
company in the early years of industrialism. The accountability and responsibility of 
business enterprise was constantly subject to question, and historically failed this test 
often in the view of the public. Maurice Clark deplored how business “inherited an 
economics of irresponsibility” from the laissez-faire beliefs and practices of early 
industrialism (1916). He argued business transactions do not occur in isolation, but have 
wider social and economic consequences that need to be considered, impacting directly 
on employment, health and the environment. He insisted legal regulation may be required 
to ensure protection from abuses, but that this could never replace a general sense of 
responsibility in business that goes beyond the letter of the law, preventing competitive 
forces leading to a race to the bottom. Hence the periodic outbreak of destructive 
competition needed to be restrained in Clark’s view by “an economics of responsibility, 
developed and embodied in our working business ethics (1916).” 
 
The debate concerning the true extent of the accountability and responsibility of business 
enterprise has continued to the present day, punctuated by occasional public outrage at 
business transgressions, and calls for greater recognition of the social obligations of 
business. At the height of the economic depression in the United States in 1932 Dodd 
made a dramatic plea in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, “…There is in fact a 
growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that our 
corporate managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal 
compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill these responsibilities” This resonated 
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with Berle and Means insistence that large corporations “serve not alone the owners or 
the control, but all society.” Though Berle subsequently commenced a prolonged debate 
with Dodd on the subject of “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees”, Berle 
(1955) later conceded to Dodd’s argument that management powers were held in trust for 
the entire community (Wedderburn 1985:6) 
 
Such forthright views did not remain at the level of academic speculation, but often were 
translated into legal, policy and business interpretations and practice. For example in  
Teck Corp Ltd v Millar, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, while retaining the 
identification of company interests with those of shareholders, nonetheless was prepared 
to grant directors a license under their fiduciary duties to take into account wider 
stakeholder interests:  
“The classical theory is that the directors’ duty is to the company. The company’s 
shareholders are the company … and therefore no interests outside those of the 
shareholders can legitimately be considered by the directors. But even accepting that, 
what comes within the definition of the interests of the shareholders? By what standards 
are the shareholders’ interests to be measured?  A classical theory that once was 
unchallengeable must yield to the facts of modern life. In fact, of course, it has. If today 
the directors of a company were to consider the interests of its employees no one would 
argue that in doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company 
itself. Similarly, if the directors were to consider the consequences to the community of 
any policy that the company intended to pursue, and were deflected in their commitment 
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to that policy as a result, it could not be said that they had not considered bona fide the 
interests of the shareholders” (Teck Corp Ltd v Millar 1973:313-4).  
 
 
Wedderburn (1985:12) documents an equivalent deep-seated and practical commitment 
of corporate responsibility to a wide constituency in the post-war beliefs of leaders of the 
British business community. A lively debate continues worldwide concerning the scope 
of directors’ duties. In Australia the Corporations Act Section 181 obliges directors and 
other corporate officers to exercise their powers and discharge their duties  
 In good faith and in the best interests of the corporation 
 For a proper purpose. 
Under common law directors are obliged to act in the interests of ‘the company as a 
whole.’ Traditionally this phrase has been interpreted to mean the financial well being of 
the shareholders as a general body. (Though directors are obliged to consider the 
financial interests of creditors when the firm is insolvent or near-insolvent).  A recent 
generation of financial economists helped to translate this broad shareholder primacy 
principle into a narrow pursuit of shareholder value. There is a wider interpretation of 
shareholder value which suggests that only when all of the other constituent relationships 
of the corporation – with customers, employees, suppliers, distributors and the wider 
community – are fully recognized and developed that long term shareholder value can be 
released. However the restrictive definition of shareholder value has often been 
associated with short-termism and a neglect of wider corporate responsibilities in the 
interests of immediate profit maximization. Concerns have arisen that directors who do 
wish to take account of other stakeholder interests may be exposed. 
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Traditionally, commercial law in many European countries has supported a sense of the 
wider social and environmental obligations of companies, which continues despite a 
recent enthusiasm for the principle of shareholder value as some large European 
companies for the first time seek the support of international investors. The UK has stood 
apart from Europe as an influential exponent of the Anglo-American market based 
approach to corporate governance. However in an effort to jettison the company law 
rhetoric formed in the 19th century, and to make the law more accessible a Company Law 
Review (CLR) steering group was established. The ensuing consultative document 
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (2000) 
proposed for the first time that there should be a statutory statement of directors duties 
(presently the core components of those duties is found in case law), and made a 
significant step in the direction of endorsing fuller corporate social and environmental 
reporting: 
 
“…Current accounting and reporting fails to provide adequate transparency of qualitative 
and forward looking information which is of vital importance in assessing performance 
and potential for shareholders, investors, creditors and others. This is particularly so in 
the modern environment of technical change, and with the growing importance of ‘soft’, 
or intangible assets, brands, know-how and business relationships. The full annual report 
must be effective in covering these, both as a stewardship report and as a medium of 
communication to wider markets and the public… we believe the time has come to 
require larger companies to provide an operating and financial review, which will cover 
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the qualitative, or ‘soft’, or intangible, and forward looking information which the 
modern market and modern business decision making requires, converting the practice of 
the best run companies into a requirement for all.’ (CLR 2000: 180-1) 
 
These issues were extensively considered in the UK for several years in the deliberations 
of the Modern Company Law Review. Two approaches were considered: 
 A pluralist approach under which directors duties would be reformulated to 
permit directors to further the interests of other stakeholders even if they were to 
the detriment of shareholders. 
 An enlightened shareholder value approach allowing directors greater flexibility 
to take into account longer term considerations and interests of various 
stakeholders in advancing shareholder value. 
 
In considering these approaches, the essential questions of what is the corporation, and 
what interests it should represent are exposed to light, as Davies eloquently argues: 
 
 “The crucial question is what the statutory statement says about the interests which the 
directors should promote when exercising their discretionary powers. The common law 
mantra that the duties of directors are owed to the company has long obscured the answer 
to this question. Although that is a statement of the utmost importance when it comes to 
the enforcement of duties and their associated remedies, it tells one nothing about the 
answer to our question, whose interests should the directors promote? This is because the 
company, as an artificial person, can have no interests separate from the interests of those 
 29 
who are associated with it, whether as shareholders, creditors, employers, suppliers, 
customers or in some other way. So, the crucial question is, when we refer to the 
company, to the interests of which of those sets of natural persons are we referring?” 
(2005:4). 
 
As a member of the Corporate Law Review Steering Group Davies goes on to defend the 
enlightened shareholder value view suggesting the pluralist approach produces a formula 
which is unenforceable, and paradoxically gives management more freedom of action 
than they previously enjoyed. An Australian legal expert, Redmond endorses this critique 
of widening the scope of directors’ duties too greatly: 
 
“The pluralist or multifiduciary model rests on a social, not a property, view of the 
corporation. It identifies the corporate purpose with maximising total constituency utility. 
This is an indeterminate outcome measure which poses particular difficulties is 
translation into a legally enforceable duty. The indeterminacy of the criteria for decision 
and performance measurement also points to a probable loss of accountability for 
directors since it offers broad scope to justify most decisions. It is difficult to resist the 
conclusion of the UK review that either it confers a broad unpoliceable policy discretion 
on managers themselves or must gives a broad jurisdiction to the courts. The model needs 
either practical rehabilitation or a superior performance metric. It is not clear where either 




In the resulting UK Company Law Reform Bill (2005) the enlightened shareholder value 
view has prevailed in Clause 156, which defines the essential directoral duty as:  
 
Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole. 
 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefit of its members, his duty is to act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to achieve those purposes. 
 
(3) In fulfilling the duty imposed by this section a director must (so far as reasonably 
practicable) have regard to– 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
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(4) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law 
requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of 
creditors of the company. 
 
This clause replaces the discretion of directors to have regard for stakeholder interests 
with a duty for directors to do this: 
 
“As far as directors’ duties are concerned, this is the heart of the enlightened shareholder 
value approach. The aim is to make it clear that although shareholder interests are 
predominant (promotion of the success of the company for the benefit of its members), 
the promotion of shareholder interests does not require riding roughshod over the 
interests of other groups upon whose activities the business of the company is dependent 
for its success. In fact, the promotion of the interests of the shareholders will normally 
require the interests of other groups of people to be fostered. The interests of non 
shareholder groups thus need to be considered by the directors, but, of course, in this 
shareholder-centred approach, only to the extent that the protection of those other 
interests promotes the interests of the shareholders. The statutory formulation can be said 
to express the insight that the shareholders are not likely to do well out of a company 
whose workforce is constantly on strike, whose customers don’t like its products and 
whose suppliers would rather deal with its competitors” (Davies 2005:5). 
 
In this way the Company Law Reform Bill treads a fine legal line between a sense of 
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‘enlightened shareholder value’ which is becoming best practice in many leading 
companies, and more radical claims for company law to adopt a more ‘pluralist’ sense of 
the ultimate objectives of the enterprise and the interests to be served. The reform 
manages this balancing act by suggesting that the pluralist objectives of maximising 
company performance to the benefit of all stakeholders can best be served by 
professional directors pursuing commercial opportunities within a framework of 
standards and accountability: 
 
“... The overall objective should be pluralist in the sense that companies should be run in 
a way which maximises overall competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all. But the 
means which company law deploys for achieving this objective must be to take 
account of the realities and dynamics which operate in practice in the running of 
commercial enterprise. It should not be done at the expense of turning company directors 
from business decisions makers into moral, political or economic arbiters, but by 
harnessing focused, comprehensive, competitive decision making within robust, objective 
professional standards and flexible, but pertinent accountability” (CLR 2000:14 ). 
 
 
The reform supports the ultimate power of shareholders to appoint or dismiss directors 
for whatever reasons they choose, and to intervene in management to the extent the 
constitution permits, and confesses: “...There is clearly an inconsistency between leaving 
these powers of shareholders intact and enabling or requiring directors to have regard to 
wider interests…the effect will be to make smaller transactions within the powers of 
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directors subject to the broad pluralist approach, but larger ones which are for 
shareholders subject only to the minimal constraints which apply to them” (CLR 2000: 
26) 
 
The United Kingdom Company Law Review (2000) in its comprehensive review of 
company law recommended a recasting of directors' duties to give effect to its notion of 
“enlightened shareholder value” ultimately contained in the Companies Bill 2006 (UK) 
which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006. The possibility that this will be 
accompanied by an extension of the requirements for company reporting to include social 
and environmental matters may appear to have receded, with the UK Chancellor’s 
dramatic abandonment of the obligatory Operating and Financial Review for listed 
companies in November 2006. However this was in the context of the European Union's 
Accounts Modernization Directive (2003/51/EC) which also requires companies include 
environmental and social reports with their annual accounts necessary for an 
understanding of the companies performance. Many large UK corporations have 
continued with their intention to publish Operating and Financial Review’s despite it no 
longer being mandatory. It is likely that these modern company law proposals will over 
time facilitate the wider and more conscious adoption by UK companies of social and 
environmental commitments, and the willingness to report fully on them. In time it is 
possible that such social and environmental commitments will become part of a 
widespread company and management best practice, in the way that the commitment to 
quality in the production of goods and services has become universal. 
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Moreover just as the UK in the publication of the Cadbury Code of corporate governance 
ultimately influenced a considerable number of other countries to adopt a similar code, it 
is possible that other countries, particularly that share a common law tradition to the UK, 
will begin to review their company law with similar objectives in mind. The twin 
inquiries that took place into corporate responsibility in Australia are illustrative of this 
widening interest . The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 
commenced in March 2005 to consider whether directors duties under the Corporations 
Act 2001 should include corporate responsibilities or obligations to take into account 
certain classes of stakeholders. The Committee published an excellent Discussion Paper 
on Corporate Social Responsibility (available free at www.camac.gov.au).  
 
The second inquiry, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporates and Financial 
Services (PJC) began in June 2005 with a call for submissions on corporate social 
responsibility, and has received over 120 extensive submissions from companies, 
consultancies, academics and other interested parties (available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/corporations_ctte/corporate_responsibility/inde
x.htm). Together these inquiries served to raise awareness of the issues involved in 
corporate responsibility considerably in Australia.  
 
The notion that a change in company law was required to clarify and strengthen directors 
duties on corporate social responsibility was rejected by both the Australian reviews, in 
favour of a range of voluntary measures. CAMAC concluded: “The Committee does not 
support the revision of the Corporations Act in the manner referred to in these questions. 
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The established formulation of directors’ duties allows directors sufficient flexibility to 
take relevant interests and broader community considerations into account. Changes of a 
kind proposed from time to time do not provide meaningful clarification for directors, yet 
risk obscuring their accountability” (2006:7). CAMAC went on to make a series of 
recommendations concerning the importance of disclosure, and encouraging responsible 
business practices. Similarly the PJC maintained, “The committee strongly supports 
further successful engagement in the voluntary development and wide adoption of 
corporate responsibility. The committee has formed the view that mandatory approaches 
to regulating director’s duties and to sustainability reporting are not appropriate. 
Consequent on the recommendations of this report, the committee expects increasing 
engagement by corporations in corporate responsibility activities. This would obviate any 
future moves towards a mandatory approach. The committee believes that the 
recommendations contained in this report will play an important part in progressing the 
future of corporate responsibility in Australia” (PJC 2006:xix). 
 
Both recent Australian official inquiries acknowledge that “Corporate responsibility in 
Australia is still in its developmental stages…” (PJC 2006:xix). Both inquiries stress the 
importance of monitoring the adoption of their recommendations, and that “ There is 
scope for additional ‘light touch’ measures by government, helping corporate and other 
participants where the opportunity arises, without constraining energy and initiative in the 
community marketplace” (CAMAC 2006:169).  
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However, the role of the law and of regulation in establishing a framework of 
accountability and management discipline is a significant factor in concentrating attention 
on this matter. In this sense some might claim the recommendations of the two Australian 
committees of inquiry, however supportive of an enhanced engagement in CSR on the 
part of companies, represent a missed opportunity with regard to the ameliorative effect 
of legal and regulatory change. Company law reform in the UK treads a fine legal line 
between a sense of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ which is becoming best practice in 
many leading companies, and more radical claims for company law to adopt a more 
‘pluralist’ sense of the ultimate objectives of the enterprise and the interests to be served, 
and in this way has served to move both policy and practice forward in a dynamic way. 
 
One reason the agenda of corporate responsibility is increasingly irresistible is that while 
legal liability of corporations is deepening, what has been described as an emerging and 
hardening moral liability is exerting increasing influence. In this respect the legislative 
process lags behind what society thinks, values and respects. Moral liability occurs when 
corporations violate stakeholder expectations of ethical behaviour in ways that put 
business value at risk. There is an increasing convergence between these two forms of 
liability, as corporations come under scrutiny both by the law and – often more 
immediately and pointedly - by public opinion (SustainAbility 2004:5). A graphic 
illustration of this was the James Hardie building company which having moved its 
corporate headquarters from Australia to the Netherlands, and the majority of its business 
activity to the United States, believed it had escaped responsibility for the legal liabilities 
of its remaining Australian subsidiaries to the thousands of asbestos victims dependent on 
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a seriously underfunded and almost bankrupt medical foundation Hardie had left behind 
to meet their claims. Massive public disapproval in Australia and internationally, and a 
commission of inquiry combined with the threat of legislative intervention, dragged 
James Hardie back to face the consequences of its irresponsible actions over many 
decades in the Australian market (Jackson 2004). 
 
Paul Redmond lays out clearly the critical parameters of a fundamental ongoing debate: 
“What should be the legal rule with respect to directors' duties? Should company law 
require directors and senior managers to act by reference to the interests of all 
stakeholders in the corporate enterprise, according primacy to no particular interests 
including those of shareholders (mandatory pluralism)? Or should company law permit 
(but not require) directors and senior managers to act by reference to the interests of all 
stakeholders, according primacy to no particular interests including those of shareholders 
(discretionary pluralism)? The most radical of these models is the mandatory pluralist 
model creating a multifiduciary duty requiring directors and managers to run the 
company in the interest of all those with a stake in its success, balancing the claims of 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, the community and other stakeholders. The claims of 
each stakeholder are recognised as valuable in their own right and no priority is accorded 
shareholders in this adjustment; their interest may be sacrificed to that of other 
stakeholders. (Stakeholders are variously defined as those with an interest in or 
dependence relationship with the company or, alternatively, as those upon whom it 
depends for its survival). The discretionary pluralist model would permit, but not require, 
directors to sacrifice shareholder interests to those of other stakeholders. One or other of 
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these models would formalise the managerialist practice that has been displaced by the 




INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS EFFECTIVE PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: 




Similar forces that are impressing corporations towards taking a greater regard of CSR 
issues are guiding investment institutions towards addressing environmental, social and 
governance issues more directly in their investment policies and practices. In the UNEP 
Finance Initiative on The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate 
Governance Issues to Equity Pricing (2004) the interest of a growing number of 
institutional investors in approaches to asset management that explicitly include 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria and metrics, either for ethical 
reasons or as relevant to investment performance was considered. Critical intermediaries 
are the brokerage firms that often have paid less consideration to ESG issues, often 
because they are driven by short term performance. A group of eleven international 
brokerage firms’ analysts were commissioned to examine a range of industry sectors 
regarding the relevance of ESG to investment performance, and to submit detailed 
reports. Briefly their conclusions were: 
 Environmental, social and governance criteria affect shareholder value 
both in the short and long term, and in some cases the effects could be 
profound. Research to determine the financial materiality of these criteria 
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should use longer time spans than is currently employed for financial 
analysis. 
 Governments could reduce barriers to environmental, social and corporate 
governance analysis by mandating and standardizing the inclusion of these 
criteria in national and international corporate disclosure frameworks. 
 Innovative techniques are being developed to perform financial analyses 
of environmental, social and corporate governance criteria in response to 
growing investor demand, including ranking surveys, portfolio analysis of 
best and worst performers, and scenario analysis to evaluate potential 
impact of upcoming regulation on sectors. 
The survey discovered that brokerage houses in Europe are increasingly willing and able 
to respond to demand for ESG research. In contrast brokerage houses in the United States 
referred to perceived difficulty in analysis due to barriers associated with inadequate 
disclosure of these criteria. 
 
A further fascinating research project of the UNEP Finance Initiative considered A Legal 
Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into 
Institutional Investment (2005). The current value of assets managed by the investment 
industry worldwide is estimated at US$42 trillion, pension fund assets in the US and UK 
alone amounting to US$7.4 trillion. However the weighty responsibility of deciding 
where these assets are invested lies not with the owners, but with a small number of 
principals and agents. “By influencing the way investments are made, the legal factors 
that inform the decisions made by this relatively small group have a profound effect on 
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the behaviour of the entities in which these assets are invested and ultimately on the 
environments and societies with which these investment vehicles interact (UNEP FI 
2005:6). 
 
Despite the increasing evidence that ESG issues do have a material impact on the 
financial performance of securities and increasing awareness of the importance of 
assessing ESG related risks, the effort to achieve a greater regard for ESG issues in 
investment decision-making is often resisted on the basis that institutional principals and 
their agents are legally prevented from taking account of these issues. Just as it is 
assumed corporate directors can only be committed to shareholder value, it is often 
assumed that investment trustees can only be directed towards profit maximization. 
However the survey conducted by the international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer confirms categorically that in each of the jurisdictions examined (France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK, US, Australia and Canada) investment decision 
makers retained some degree of discretion as to how they might invest the funds they 
control.  
 
In the common law jurisdictions (US, UK, Australia and Canada) the rules are articulated 
in statute and in court decisions. In the other jurisdictions as civil law applies, rules are 
articulated as codes or in statutes. Though in none of the jurisdictions do rules prescribe 
how principals should integrate ESG considerations into their decisions, in most cases it 
is left to principals to determine their investment approach within their legal obligations. 
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Fiduciary duties are the key discretionary limits of investment decision makers in 
common law countries, the most important duties being the duty to act prudently and the 
duty to act in accordance with the purpose for which investment powers were granted 
(the duty of loyalty). 
 
In the US the modern prudent investor rule, which incorporates both a duty of care and a 
duty of loyalty, emphasizes modern portfolio theory and provides that: 
 investments are assessed not in isolation but in the context of their contribution to 
a total investment portfolio; 
 there is no duty to ‘maximise’ the return of individual investments, but instead a 
duty to implement an overall investment strategy that is rational and appropriate 
to the fund; 
 the investment portfolio must be diversified, unless it is prudent not to do so; and 
 the prudence of an investment should be assessed at the time the investment was 
made and not in hindsight. 
The effect of the modern prudent investor rule is that institutional decision-makers are 
given latitude to follow a wide range of diversified investment strategies, provided their 
choice of investments is rational and economically defensible, they are free to construct a 
balanced portfolio (UNEP FI 2005:8). Other jurisdictions stipulate the duty to act 
conscientiously in the interests of beneficiaries, to seek profitability, recognize the 
portfolio approach to modern investment, and in some jurisdictions limits on the types of 
assets which may be selected for particular funds. 
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Two things which are critical in all jurisdictions are following the correct process, and 
pursuing proper objectives in terms of acting only in the interests of the beneficiaries. As 
with other investment criteria, different considerations will be given different weight, 
according to how conditions are defined and analysed. In some circumstances it may be 
decided that ESG considerations have little material impact on financial performance 
relevant to a particular investment. However this does not justify failure to identify such 
considerations and to assess the weight. It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that 
ESG considerations are difficult to quantify, since good will and intangibles are now 
readily quantified. A majority of the jurisdictions surveyed have already legislated to 
require investment decision makers, particularly of pension funds to disclose the extent to 
which they take ESG considerations into account. 
 
There is increasingly credible evidence that ESG considerations have a vital role to play 
in the proper analysis of investment value, and cannot be ignored as they would result in 
investments being given inappropriate value for example: “Climate change is an obvious 
example of an environmental consideration that is recognised as affecting value. 
Following the recent release of a report by Mercer Investment Consulting noting the 
financial impact that climate change has already had on companies’ costs, revenues, 
assets and liabilities, the UK Carbon Trust expressed the view that ‘Pension fund trustees 
have a duty to address the financial risk posed by climate change when making 
investment decisions’” (UNEP FI 2005:11) 
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Investment institutions are not only becoming more alert regarding the ESG issues in 
their investment portfolio they are also beginning to take a proactive stance in terms of 
engaging in the environmental, social and governance performance of the corporations 
they invest in. Both in the US and UK the traditional passivity of the investment 
institutions is being cast aside in favour of more active involvement. Certainly they 
continue to prefer quiet influence to open confrontation, but in an increasing number of 
instances the institutional investors have demonstrated a willingness to use their power to 
insist on higher standards of governance, and there are some indications this may occur 
more frequently in future on wider ESG issues. 
 
CORPORATE REPORTING OF CSR 
If the revival of interest in CSR is to continue to develop, and not descend into 
apologetics as previous efforts have done, and if the current wave of interest in ESG 
issues in the investment community is to bear fruit in more enduring returns, then what is 
absolutely critical is the accuracy and verifiability of corporate disclosure regarding CSR 
performance. In this regard the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Principles are an 
invaluable tool for working towards international confidence in the trustworthiness of 
corporate reporting. The overall aim of the GRI-based reporting is to: 
 provide a balanced and reasonable representation of an organisation’s 
sustainability performance 
 facilitate comparability 
 address issues of concern to stakeholders 
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The GRI reporting principles are the underpinnings of corporate report content, and as 
such are as important as the content itself. The reporting principles are: 
 Transparency: Full disclosure of the processes, procedures and assumptions in 
report preparation are essential to its credibility. 
 Inclusiveness: The reporting organisation should engage its stakeholders in 
preparing and enhancing the quality of reports. 
 Auditability: Reported information should be recorded, compiled, analysed and 
disclosed in a way that enables internal auditors or external assurance providers to 
attest to its reliability.  
 Completeness: All material information should appear in the report. 
 Relevance: Reporting organisations should use the degree of importance that 
report users assign to particular information in determining report content. 
 Sustainability Context: Reporting organisations should seek to place their 
performance in the broader context of ecological, social or other issues where 
such context adds significant meaning to the reported information. 
 Accuracy: Reports should achieve a degree of exactness and low margin of error 
to enable users to make decisions with a high degree of confidence. 
 Neutrality: Reports should avoid bias in selection and presentation of information 
and provide a balanced account of performance. 
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 Comparability: Reports should be framed so as to facilitate comparison to earlier 
reports as well as to reports of comparable organisations. 
 Clarity: Information should be presented in a manner that is understandable by a 





Of course the Global Reporting Initiative is only one of a wide set of global principles, 
guidelines and standards. Hopefully over time greater coherence will be achieved in 
terms of globally accepted CSR principles, accounting principles, specialized CSR 
standards, and overall management systems as processes of normative and regulative 
change coalesce. The work of developing, implementing and verifying these reporting 
standards for corporate social and environmental responsibility will continue for many 
years to come, replicating the effort that is now being made in the quest to achieve better 
measurement and reporting of intangibles. However the whole edifice of CSR and ESG 
analysis and valuation will rest on the adequacy and rigour of reporting standards. 
 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS: THE REDESIGN OF THE CORPORATION 
It could be argued that the whole corporate social and environmental responsibility 
project, however worthy, is probably too little and too late. A more sympathetic view is 
that in its revived form CSR represents a new beginning in corporate reform that may be 
built on to create more substantial and enduring results. Certainly further efforts will be 
required to further ensure the accountability of corporations, on a universal and not 
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simply voluntary basis. A group of business and community leaders in the US have 
projected a vision of Corporation 2020 based on the imperative to redesign the 
corporation. The principles they advocate are that the purpose of the corporation is to 
harness private interests to serve the public interest, that fair returns to shareholders 
should not be at the expense of the legitimate interests of other stakeholders, that 
corporations should operate sustainably, and that corporations distribute wealth produced 
equitably among those who contribute to the creation of that wealth. Robert Hinkley 
offers a 28 word amendment to directors duties which states that they are to act in the 
interests of the company  “but not at the expense of the environment, human rights, 
public health and safety, dignity of employees, or the welfare of communities in which 
the corporation operates” (Luis 2005). 
 
It is possible to envisage a business world not characterized by the bipolar disorder of the 
ongoing shareholder/stakeholder debate. The effective integration of corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities could potentially release greater value for both 
shareholders and wider stakeholders. Moving beyond compliance, to creating new value 
through new products and services that meet societal needs. Collaborating to solve the 
complex and demanding social and environmental problems that threaten to grow beyond 
our control. Corporations capable of working in investors, stakeholders, and societies 
interests in a collaborative, creative and productive way would require a fundamental 
redesign of the concept of the corporation and the institution of the market. At this stage 
both prospects appear remote. However we live in an industrial world where the problem 
of material production has essentially been solved. The primary remaining global 
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dilemmas are that overproduction and massive surpluses still coexist with desperate 
poverty and need, and that the resource base for industry is rapidly depleting and 
damaging, potentially irreparably, the eco-system. It is possible that confronting these 
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